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Today, fifty years after the end of the Warren Court and the start of the criminal 
procedure revolution, the United States criminal justice system is in crisis. Our 
incarceration rate over the ensuing years has risen dramatically as the following 
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The chart shows our prison population historically starting in 1925 and 
continuing until 2017. What is, of course, shocking is the steep increase in the 
U.S. prison population that begins in the mid-1970s and continues sharply 
upward for the next few decades until 2009 when the number levelled off and 
there is a slight decline in the last several years. 
In 2017, U.S. prisons held 1,439,808 citizens. But this understates our 
incarceration problem because we have many more citizens incarcerated because 
the chart does not include those being held in jails in the United States. In 2019, 
there were an additional 612,000 citizens in our jails. Adding together those in 
prison and those in our jails, the total is more than two million citizens 
incarcerated. 
It would be easier to understand the sharp and sustained rise in our 
incarceration rate over the last forty years if it were a common phenomenon 
among other western countries. But other western countries have incarceration 
rates that have held rather steady over the period when our rate rose sharply. The 
press has given quite a bit of attention to this contrast between the U.S. 
incarceration rate and the rates in other countries. The New York Times, for 
example, published a front-page article in 2008 on the topic complete with an 
interactive chart that allowed readers to click on different countries around the 
world and compare incarceration rates.3 When a reader did so, it was clear why 
 
3.  Adam Liptak, Inmate Count in U.S. Dwarfs Other Nations’, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
23, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/23/us/23prison.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
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the headline of the article intoned that Inmate Count in U.S. Dwarfs Other 
Nations’. 
The article noted—what is clear from the above chart—that from 1925 to 
1970, the rate was stable at roughly 110 people in prison per 100,000 people. 
After 1970, the incarceration rate began to significantly increase.4 
Similarly, in 2010, the Economist featured a cover story on the extreme 
U.S. incarceration rate, featuring a drawing of Lady Liberty looking balefully out 
from behind the bars of a cell.5 The article stated that “[n]o other rich country is 
nearly as punitive as the Land of the Free,” and as proof of that fact, the article 
noted that the United States incarceration rate was five times greater than 
Britain’s, nine times greater than Germany’s and twelve times greater than in 
Japan’s.6 
The typical response to the disparity in incarceration rates blame this 
terrible situation on one or two of several factors: “It was the war on drugs” or “It 
was harsh sentencing laws.” What you will never hear is: “Unfortunately, our 
criminal procedure revolution stemming from the Warren Court years failed.” 
This article asserts precisely the last point: an important factor in our escalating 
incarceration rate was the failure of the criminal procedure revolution. 
Now let me quickly put my argument in perspective. I am not absolving 
our drug laws or our harsh sentencing laws of any blame in our present crisis. 
Nor am I saying the criminal procedure revolution “caused” our incarceration 
rate to rise. There were many factors in the rise. What I am saying is that for too 
long we have preferred to avoid a topic that is painful to many who grew up in 
the Warren Court era—that not everything the Court did turned out well. I 
include myself in this group. As a law student, then a prosecutor, and then a 
“baby” professor, I could see little wrong with many of the Court’s decisions. 
But as I evolved into an elderly comparatist who has spent many hours in 
courtrooms all around the world, I now have a different perspective on what the 
Court did. 
This article will discuss one way in which we differ from other common 
law countries—the Court’s expansion of the right to jury trial to misdemeanors in 
Baldwin v. New York7 in 1970. 
But before I talk about that case and the issues involved, I want to 
explain why the criminal procedure revolution was always going to be very risky. 
Section I of this article will discuss the risks of constitutional rulemaking. 
Section II will discuss the importance of trials for keeping incarceration rates in 
 
Review). 
4.  Id.  
5.  Rough Justice, THE ECONOMIST (July 22, 2010), 
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2010/07/22/rough-justice (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review). 
6.  Id. 
7.  399 U.S. 66 (1970). 
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check. Section III will then turn to Baldwin and explain how the insistence that 
misdemeanors be tried to a jury was a serious mistake. 
I. THE RISKS OF CONSTITUTIONAL RULEMAKING 
A. The Limits of a Constitutional Case 
When criminal cases go to the Supreme Court, the Court knows what 
happened to this particular defendant, the issues that were raised, and what the 
lower court rulings were. Litigation is meant to sort out the facts of the case and 
determine who did what to whom and why. But when the Court is making 
constitutional rulings that will apply across the country, the narrow focus of 
traditional litigation is a problem. 
The case before the Court may be dramatic but the Court will often not 
know with precision (a) how often this problem comes up; (b) how serious it 
usually is (compared to the case up for review); and (c) whether the problem 
occurs only in a few states or many. 
The Court will, of course, have two argumentative briefs in front of it 
and may have some amicus briefs from others—but they are usually written from 
a partisan perspective. These briefs will vary in quality and they are not written 
with the goal of painting a complete picture of the issue. Indeed, the lawyers 
writing the briefs may have no idea exactly how often the problem before the 
Court arises. 
Obviously, there will be cases where the Court is simply deciding 
whether the ruling in the case below was correct, e.g., was the confession 
voluntary or was the officer justified in stopping the suspect. But, when the Court 
is making a more sweeping ruling, especially one that requires additional 
hearings, the limits of the case are a risk. The Court may be adding significant 
expense for a problem that may often not be serious. 
B. The Court’s Lack of Expertise 
When a legislative body (or an administrative agency) is considering 
adopting a certain rule, it can commission neutral studies of the issue or hold 
public hearings where experts of all stripes can give their opinions and be 
questioned about those opinions. It can gather the neutral expertise that 
individual legislators don’t possess. 
The Court itself also possesses very limited expertise on many of 
criminal procedure issues it faces. Some justices have typically been chosen from 
one of the federal appellate benches or they may even have been a federal trial 
judge. But how many have been state court judges or spent any time in 
misdemeanor courtrooms? How many have been public defenders or 
prosecutors? How many have trial experience? Or are familiar with how the 
private defense makes a living? 
The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 51 
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Supreme Court justices, of course, have a bevy of smart young law clerks 
at their disposal that can research any legal issue to find cases going back to the 
start of the republic. But they typically have no experience in the field. 
The Court’s lack of expertise is fine when it is making major moral 
decisions on important issues or interpreting a federal statute (which Congress 
can easily amend). But, when the Court is making rules about the questioning of 
suspects and where such questioning should take place, it lacks expertise. 
Sometimes the lack of expertise, or even a certain naivete, shows itself in 
their opinions. In Miranda v. Arizona,8 where the Court announced that the Fifth 
Amendment requires a right to counsel for arrestees prior to questioning at a 
police station, the opinion states; “If the accused decides to talk to his 
interrogators, the assistance of counsel can mitigate the dangers of 
untrustworthiness . . . . The presence of a lawyer can also help to guarantee that 
the accused gives a fully accurate statement to the police . . . .”9 
This image of a lawyer called to an interrogation room and then helping 
the arrestee to make a statement to the police is completely unrealistic. If you are 
a public defender and are called to the police station to assist someone arrested 
for murder and the arrestee says, “I want to confess. I did it.” You haven’t looked 
at any police reports because they haven’t been written. You don’t know the 
evidence, you don’t know the arrestee, but according to the Court, you are going 
to help the arrestee make a fully accurate statement to the police? The lawyer will 
always say, “Don’t say anything. Let me study the evidence in the case and we 
can decide together what to do. A full confession may be appropriate, but not at 
this time. It won’t hurt to wait until I see the evidence and talk to the prosecutor.” 
C. The Inability to Obtain Feedback on Proposed Rules, Requirements, or 
Standards 
One of the most serious problems the Court faces when deciding on a 
rule intended to solve a problem is the inability to obtain feedback on a possible 
rule. By contrast, an administrative agency or a legislative body can always seek 
feedback on possible rules. 
Perhaps, the rule the Court is contemplating will solve the problem, but 
perhaps it is too narrow or too broad for the particular problem. Or, the rule may 
impact courts or police officers in rural counties in a way that differs markedly 
from the way it would impact courts and police forces in large cities. 
Making a draft statute or a proposed regulation available for public 
comment often improves the proposal and makes passage or adoption more likely 
if possible negative impacts are brought to the attention of the drafters and the 
proposed draft is amended to avoid or lesson such impacts. 
 
8.  384 U.S. 436 (1966).) 
9.  Id. at 470. 
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The Supreme Court cannot get the same feedback, which increases the 
risks of rules not working out as intended. 
D. The Language of Constitutional Decisions 
When the Court announces a decision imposing a rule that must be 
followed by police, prosecutors, or judges in every police station or courthouse in 
the country, the Court has to be strong and sweeping in the language it uses to 
announce the rule. The Court has to find the procedure to be demanded by the 
Constitution and to be obvious. The Court cannot say things like “This was the 
best proposal on which we were able to get a majority to agree on” or “We think 
this decision is supported by common law history but there is some evidence that 
raises a doubt.” Instead, it must insist that the particular constitutional provision 
on which it is basing its ruling “demands no less.” 
What this means is that the Court tends to oversell its ruling and strongly 
commits to a rule or a standard that may not work out. At the same time, the 
Court will often tend to denigrate the rule it is striking down and replacing. There 
may be sound practical reasons why a state or a city adopted the rule being 
struck, but they will be summarily dismissed as clearly insufficient to justify the 
state procedure. 
E. The Court’s Limited Options for Reform 
The Supreme Court has only a very limited arsenal for solving a 
particular problem. The Court doesn’t have the broad range of options that a 
legislature possesses that might be used to avoid or limit the particular problem. 
The Court cannot, for example, draft statutes or rules of procedure that might 
prevent abuses or trial problems from occurring. It can’t command by 
constitutional fiat, for example, that police officers wear body cameras and 
require that they be turned on in certain situations. 
Another area demonstrating the Court’s struggles because its reform 
options are limited is that of is police lineups.10 Preventing the contamination of 
witness identifications due to suggestive lineups remains a very serious problem 
in the United States and it is a source of many false convictions. 
Suggestive lineups might be severely limited if there were rules in place 
that required: a certain minimum number of the people in the lineup, an 
administrator with no prior knowledge of who the suspect might be, restrictions 
on what should and should not be said to the witness before the lineup, mandated 
 
10.  Compare United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (seemingly requiring the presence of counsel at 
lineups to prevent suggestive lineups leading to false convictions), with Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) 
(noting that the Court narrowed the previous decision by limiting counsel to post-indictment lineups which are 
rare occurrences). See Michael Vitiello, The Warren Court’s Eyewitness Identification Case Law: What if?, 51 
U. PAC. L. REV. 867 (2020). 
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use of video equipment, rules restricting the way statements should be taken from 
a witness after the lineup, and so on. Such a set of rules would likely require 
exceptions in certain situations such as the delicate health of a witness. 
Good lineup procedures could foreclose many later problems, but the 
Court can’t enact such legislation within the confines of a constitutional ruling. 
The Court has only a broad brush with which to draw constitutional lines and it 
would be hard to see how due process demands this precise set of sensible lineup 
precautions. 
Another area where the Court struggles because of its limited options for 
preventing problems is jury selection. For example, prosecutors often try to 
remove as many black prospective jurors as they can using peremptory 
challenges. (Peremptory challenges are, of course, those challenges for which a 
prosecutor or a defense attorney need not give an explanation.) 
One way to limit the use of peremptory challenges to remove all black 
jurors would be to limit sharply the number of peremptory challenges available. 
What if the number were reduced to three or two in routine felony cases? 
Peremptory challenges could still serve their function as a backup to challenges 
for cause, but it would be much harder to remove systematically all the jurors of 
a certain race or gender. A reduced number of peremptory challenges would also 
help ensure a broader cross-section of citizens on juries even apart from race or 
gender and it might also speed up laborious jury selection processes. 
As sensible as a rule limiting peremptories might be, the Court simply 
can’t dictate rules like this. Instead, when the Court addressed issues relating to 
the abuse of peremptory challenges in Batson v. Kentucky,11 the Court’s options 
were: (a) whether to make peremptories less “peremptory” or (b) whether to 
abolish by constitutional fiat all peremptory challenges or (c) whether to do 
nothing about the abuse of peremptories? 
The Court chose option (a) which requires a delicate hearing to 
determine whether a lawyer improperly used a challenge to remove a juror solely 
on the basis of race. This is not an easy task where challenges are labelled 
“peremptory” and lawyers can remove jurors for any reason except solely on the 
basis of race. Batson is generally considered very ineffective in achieving its 
purpose.12 
F. Tackling Issues in Isolation from Other Issues 
The narrow focus of Supreme Court decisions presents problems for 
criminal procedure reform because the Court cannot tie together issues the way a 
legislature can. Returning to the jury selection problem, one way to solve the 
problem of the abuse of peremptory challenges on the basis of race might be to 
 
11.  476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
12.  Viewing Batson as ineffective, Justice Breyer has urged the Court to reconsider Batson and the 
peremptory challenge system in its entirety. See Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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tie reform with another issue, such as nonunanimous jury verdicts. One 
legislative compromise might be to abolish peremptory challenges but to permit 
nonunanimous verdicts. For example, England abolished peremptory challenges, 
but judges may accept a nonunanimous verdict of 10-2 after two hours of 
deliberation. 
There are many reasons to object to this proposal: will it lead to false 
convictions? Why the number 10 and 2? Why not 9 and 3, or 8 and 4? Scotland 
has juries of 15 and accepts verdicts of 8-7.13 
But the point here is not the merits of this specific proposal but the way 
in which issues can be tied together to reach something of a compromise. If this 
were a legislative proposal, a state might set up a pilot project in a certain county 
to see how the proposal works limiting it perhaps to less serious crimes where no 
imprisonment will result. A pilot project would consider questions like: How 
much time does it save? What percentage of cases end in unanimous versus 
nonunanimous verdicts? What do judges who are handling the cases think? What 
is the effect on the representativeness of juries? Etc. 
Unfortunately, the Court doesn’t have the ability to tie issues together in 
this way. 
G. The Supreme Court and the Law of Unintended Consequences 
Legislation, no matter how well intended, may turn out to be ineffective 
in solving the problem it was intended to solve or it may have serious side effects 
that were not anticipated. 
In 2005, Congress passed the Energy Policy Act of 2005 that mandated 
the production of 7.5 billion gallons of ethanol by 2012. Two years later, 
Congress upped the mandate to 15 billion gallons of ethanol by 2015.14 The 
objectives of this legislation were to reduce our dependence on foreign oil, cut 
greenhouse emissions, and reduce fuel costs to motorists. 
There have been ways in which ethanol has achieved some of its 
objectives, but the benefits have not been as great as anticipated and there have 
been serious—or, more accurately, terrible negative consequences for the 
environment. 
Consider some of the unintended consequences of the law. First, the 
United States accounts for 53% of world corn exports.15 When large amounts of 
corn are devoted to ethanol, there is less corn to export and it is more expensive. 
There is also less corn available to feed livestock or to turn into food products, so 
 
13.  See The Modern Scottish Jury in Criminal Trials, SCOTTISH GOV’T, 
https://www2.gov.scot/Publications/2008/09/17121921/9 (last updated Sept. 17, 2008) (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
14.  Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, 110 Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492 (2007). 
15.  See James M. Griffin & Mauricio Cifuentes Soto, The Unintended Consequences of America’s Ethanol 
Policy, HOUSTON CHRONICLE (May 4, 2012), https://www.chron.com/opinion/outlook/article/The-unintended-
consequences-of-America-s-ethanol-3535969.php (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
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corn prices rise and food becomes more expensive.16 In the U.S., we only spend 
11.4% of our disposable income on food and we have options if food prices 
rise—we can substitute cheaper foods.17 But, in developing countries, food 
absorbs 40% of a person’s disposable income, and there are often no less 
expensive substitutes.18 
Incentivizing the growing of corn has serious negative consequences for 
the environment. One of the most serious is the effect on our rivers by nitrates 
from fertilizers needed to raise corn.19 When there is a lot of rain in the Midwest, 
the nitrates reach the Mississippi, increasing the algae bloom in the Gulf of 
Mexico which is now the size of Massachusetts.20 Rising corn prices around the 
world also encourages deforestation as countries try to raise their own corn.21 
In June, 2018, the Environmental Protection Agency issued a long-
delayed report entitled Biofuels and the Environment: The Second Triennial 
Report to Congress.22 The report concluded that ethanol derived from corn and 
soybeans is harming soil and land use, water quality, and air quality.23 
The disastrous effect of our ethanol program is one example of what 
economists term “the law of unintended consequences.” The law of unintended 
consequences warns that any government action, no matter how well intended, 
may have consequences that overwhelm the benefits that the law sought to 
achieve. 
The Supreme Court is not immune from the law of unintended 
consequences and—for the reasons mentioned above, such as the Court’s limited 
data on issues before it—the risks of something turning out wrong are greater 
than they are for legislation. This is where we are today. The Warren Court took 
major risks in issuing sweeping rulings intended to improve our criminal justice 
system. In retrospect, such reforms were always going to be a high-risk endeavor 
and the criminal procedure revolution contributed to our present incarceration 
problem. 
 
16.  Id. 
17.  Id. 
18.  Id. 
19.  See Renee Choo, Ethanol’s Impacts on Our Water Resources, COLUMBIA UNIV. (Mar. 21, 2011), 
https://blogs.ei.columbia.edu/2011/03/21/ethanol’s-impacts-on-our-water-resources (on file with The University 
of the Pacific Law Review). 
20.  Id.  
21.  See Biofuels Menace Rainforests, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 17, 2007), 
https://www.theguardian.com/science/blog/2007/aug/17/biofuelsmenacerainforests (on file with The University 
of the Pacific Law Review). 
22.  See Biofuels and the Environment: The Second Triennial Report to Congress, EPA (June 29, 2018), 
https://cfpub.epa.gov/si/si_public_record_report.cfm?Lab=IO&dirEntryId=341491 (on file with The University 
of the Pacific Law Review). 
23.  Jonathan Lewis, EPA’s Report on the Environmental Impact of Biofuels, CLEAN AIR TASK FORCE (Oct. 
4, 2019), https://www.catf.us/2018/07/epa-report-environmental-impacts-biofuels/ (on file with The University 
of the Pacific Law Review). 
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II. THE IMPORTANCE OF TRIALS 
A. The Disappearance of Trials 
In 2004, the American Bar Association (“ABA”) Section on Litigation—
alarmed by the decline in trials in U.S. courtrooms—financed a major project 
appropriately entitled The Vanishing Trial. The project studied the alarming 
decline of trials held in U.S. courts from many different angles.24 More than 400 
pages of articles were published in the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies.25 The 
data highlighted not only a startling decrease in the percentage of cases that go to 
trial, but also a decrease in the absolute number of trials. The study noted more 
trials took place in U.S. courtrooms in the 1960s and 1970s than take place in 
courtrooms today despite increased numbers of trial judges in most 
jurisdictions.26 
The phenomenon affects both civil and criminal trials. But in the civil 
area, several ways are available to resolve cases short of trial that allow the 
parties to present their side of the issues but spare them the enormous strains and 
costs of trial. 
But in the criminal area, it is plea bargaining that resolves all but a small 
handful of criminal cases. Today the plea-bargaining rate is 97% or 98% in most 
jurisdictions. 
Our federal system, once a model for the states in the way things should 
be done, is a sad example of the decline in criminal trials. The ABA’s report on 
the vanishing trial found that although the number of judges doubled between 
1962 and 2002, the absolute number of criminal trials declined 30% between 
1962 and 2002.27 
State systems are no better. The plea-bargaining rates also hover close to 
98% in most states and trials have become rare. Concerns also exists regarding 
the types of cases that actually go to trial. There is the worry that we are not 
trying the cases that should go to trial: the close cases where defendants have a 
colorable defense. Instead, cases are tried because no plea bargain is possible 
because the defendant will receive a mandatory life sentence no matter what or 
because there are other reasons why the defendant simple can’t afford a 
conviction. 
The dearth of trials is hardly a secret. In 2016, The New York Times 
detailed the absence of trials in an article entitled, Trial by Jury, a Hallowed 
American Right, Is Vanishing.28 The article focused on the Southern District of 
 
24.  See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and 
State Courts, 1 J. OF EMPIR. LEGAL STUD. 459, 459–60 (2004). 
25.  Id. 
26.  Id. at 500, 516. 
27.  Id. at 493, 500. 
28.  Benjamin Weiser, Trial by Jury, a Hallowed American Right, Is Vanishing,, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/08/nyregion/jury-trials-vanish-and-justice-is-served-behind-closed-
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New York, which is often considered the most prestigious of the federal district 
court benches in the country.29 
The article stated that in 2015 a bench with forty district court judges 
heard only fifty criminal trials that year.30 The article mentioned one judge who 
had presided over only four criminal trials in six years on the bench and another 
judge who has not had a criminal trial for eighteen months. The article states that 
the plea-bargaining rate in federal courts in 1970 was roughly 80% meaning that 
80% of convictions came from plea bargains.31 That plea-bargaining rate today is 
97%.32 Trials have indeed vanished. 
The federal court system has few cases compared to state court systems, 
with talented prosecutors and defense attorneys, and with excellent judges who 
have lifetime appointments. The federal system is also supported with 
tremendous resources and could afford many more trials than occur today,33 but 
its courtrooms are usually dark. 
B. The Effects of Trials on Charging 
In criminal cases, we tend to think of the investigating officers and the 
prosecutor as working together and “on the same side,” which is probably a fair 
assessment when a case is at the trial stage. But, in every country with a strong 
trial system, there is considerable tension between the police and the prosecuting 
authority when it comes to deciding which cases to pursue. This is true whether 
the person filing the charges is referred to as “the Crown” (Canada), the “state’s 
attorney” (Norway), the “Crown prosecutor” (England), or the “procurator fiscal” 
(Scotland). 
There is tension over the filing of charges because the police and 
prosecutors have different perspectives on charging. The police want the cases 
they have worked on and solved—cleared cases—prosecuted. They know who 
committed the crime and want to see their work rewarded: the perpetrator tried, 
convicted, and punished. 
But, prosecutors only want to prosecute strong cases—those where they 
can confidently prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, not an easy standard. This 
will be particularly the case with felonies. It may be that the person the police 
want prosecuted has done similar things in the past, but the prosecutor may doubt 
the admissibility of these prior acts. Or in some cases the trial may present the 
 
doors.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
29.  Id. 
30.  Id. 
31.  Id. 
32.  Id. 
33.  See generally Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 
154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 117–21 (2005) (highlighting how professor Ronald Wright crunches the numbers on cases 
in federal courts per district judge and finds that the caseload rise over the last few decades was modest and not 
sufficient to explain the sharp rise in the guilty plea rate). 
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jury with two different accounts of the incident—a claimed assault, for example, 
where the defendant claims self-defense. Even though the prosecutor finds the 
victim’s testimony completely convincing, she may choose not to prosecute 
without additional evidence corroborating the victim’s account. Proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt is a high standard and it should force prosecutors to be selective 
in choosing those cases they will pursue.  
In understanding the messiness of criminal cases and the problems of 
proof that can occur, it is important to distinguish the different nature of cases in 
state courts from those in federal courts. In state courts, unlike crimes in federal 
courts, many cases are interpersonal, meaning that defendants and victims that 
had a prior relationship of some sort. This is certainly true in domestic violence, 
child abuse, and sexual assault, but it is also true even of property crimes. What 
looks like a burglary under the law may look quite different to a jury, especially 
when the jury understands the victim owed money to the defendant or had taken 
some of the defendant’s personal effects at a prior time. 
Similarly, an assault case may look strong at first glance—the defendant 
assaulted the victim as the victim exited a bar late at night. But it may turn out to 
be an unsympathetic case for the prosecutor when she learns that the victim had 
been taunting the defendant with racial or religious epithets in the bar and had 
resisted calls to stop from D and other patrons. 
One might think that the way to handle problematic cases like these 
would be to charge the defendant with the crime but offer a lenient plea bargain 
to dispose of the case. But these are the cases that don’t plea bargain if trial is a 
realistic option because defense attorneys can see the problems with the case. 
This is, of course, a generalization as there are serious crimes, such as 
homicides, rapes, and serious assaults where prosecutors will be under pressure 
to file charges even though the case has some problems. But, many routine 
criminal cases—burglaries, possessions of stolen goods, simple assaults, and 
thefts—will not be prosecuted if they are not very strong cases. Prosecutors do 
not want to prepare for and devote a week to a trial only to see the jury return a 
“not guilty” verdict. There are always plenty of stronger cases to pursue. 
But, when trials are not an option because the prosecutor has ways to 
force the defendant to accept a plea bargain—such as the availability of charges 
with high mandatory minimum sentences—this healthy tension between the 
police and prosecutors over charging disappears. Prosecutors can charge crimes 
that would be hard to prove beyond a reasonable doubt at trial because the 
defendant cannot afford the risk of trial. This is the reality of the criminal justice 
system in the United States, which unfortunately contributes to our high 
incarceration rate. The realistic possibility of a trial imposes a discipline on the 
system that is missing when trials vanish. 
Not only do strong trial systems keep “weak” cases from being 
prosecuted, they force prosecutors to make hard choices among the crimes that 
will be prosecuted and those that will be handled in other ways. With respect to 
minor crimes, such as misdemeanors, a strong trial system encourages cities to 
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look at other options for handling anti-social behaviors other than use the 
criminal justice system. 
I have used the term “strong trial systems” so let me explain what this 
means. A strong trial system needs three attributes: (1) it must have fair 
procedures; (2) it must produce reliable verdicts in which the public can have 
confidence; and (3) it must make efficient use of its resources. 
Fair procedures seem basic to any system—the system needs to have 
procedures that allow relevant evidence to be gathered, to be admitted at trial, 
and to be tested. Thus, if a system does not permit indigent defendants access to 
scientific experts or if a system allows prosecutors to keep helpful evidence from 
the defense, we would not consider those procedures fair. 
But, fair procedures are insufficient if the factfinders cannot be trusted to 
understand the evidence and reach verdicts in which we have confidence. 
Perfection in convicting the guilty and acquitting the innocent is not attainable in 
any system, but in strong trial systems miscarriages of justice are rare and can be 
rectified without damaging the wronged individual. 
Finally, trial systems need to be efficient to be strong. This is, of course, 
a relative concept; there will be trials that may turn on complex issues with 
multiple defendants that may take months to complete. But whatever procedure a 
country adopts for its trials, one would hope that it makes efficient use of what 
will always be limited resources. 
These issues are obviously related. If you have fair procedures, but they 
are extremely complicated, that may impact the system’s efficiency. If trials are 
lengthy that may impact reliability as factfinders may have trouble remembering 
and putting together information gained over several days or weeks or sometimes 
months. 
The United States lacks a strong trial system. One can see clear evidence 
of this in the systematic avoidance of trials in the federal system and state 
systems. 
In the New York Times article mentioned above on the dearth of trials in 
the Southern District of New York, many judges say the “right” things—how it is 
a shame to be losing trials as they expose the working of the system to the public. 
But, the reality is that federal judges do not want trials any more than state 
judges.  
 
Between 2006 and 2016, the number of criminal trials in federal courts 
declined 47%.34 In 2015, out of 81,000 federal criminal cases, there were only 
1,759 trials.35 The trial rate was thus 2%. This time period occurred after the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines were made advisory,36 which freed judges 
 
34.  See Robert J. Conrad & Katy L. Clements, The Vanishing Criminal Jury Trial: From Trial Judges to 
Sentencing Judges, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 99, 104 (2018).  
35.  Id.  
36.  See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
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Guidelines’ sentencing strictures. (Judges depart from the Guidelines’ ranges in 
more than 50% of sentencings.37 ) Some predicted the ability of judges to 
sentence more freely would lead to a sharp rise in the number of trials. Instead, 
the trial rate continued to decline. Without trials, there are no brakes on charging 
decisions. 
III. MANDATING JURY TRIALS FOR MISDEMEANOR CASES 
A. Baldwin v. New York 
In Duncan v. Louisiana,38 the Supreme Court extended the right to jury 
trial to felony cases. Duncan was an iconic case of the civil rights era with Gary 
Duncan and a courageous team of lawyers challenging the staunchly 
segregationist establishment in Plaquemines Parish, a parish located fifty miles 
south of New Orleans.39 In the course of ruling that Duncan’s felony conviction 
for assault was unconstitutional because he had been denied a jury trial, the Court 
ruled that jury trials were required for “serious crimes,” but it left to another day 
the precise line that would separate “serious crimes” requiring a jury and “petty 
offenses” where no jury would be required.40 
In 1970, in Baldwin v. New York,41 the Court set out to resolve the 
constitutionality of trials without juries in misdemeanor cases. The case arose 
because New York City did not provide jury trials to defendants charged with 
misdemeanors, and Robert Baldwin—who had been charged with a 
pickpocketing offense of “jostling”—had been convicted without a jury and 
sentenced to a year in jail.42 
New York City presented a stark contrast to Plaquemines Parish, the 
venue of Gary Duncan’s trial. The New York county District Attorney’s Office 
in the late 1960’s had long been considered one of the finest prosecutorial offices 
in the country.43 Prosecutors, including Thomas Dewey, Frank Hogan, and later 
Robert Morgenthau, in that office not only handled the sort of high volume 
crimes that plague any major city, but they undertook important investigations of 
political corruption, organized crime, and white collar crime. 
 
37.  See Conrad & Clements, supra note 33, at 131. 
38.  391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
39.  See NANCY J. KING, Duncan v. Louisiana: How Bigotry in the Bayou Led to the Federal Regulation of 
State Juries, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW STORIES (C. Steiker, ed. Foundation Press 2006). 
40.  Duncan, 391 U.S. at 161. 
41.  399 U.S. 66 (1970).) 
42.  Id. at 67. 
43.  See Chip Brown, Cyrus Vance, Jr.’s ‘Moneyball’ Approach to Crime, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/07/magazine/cyrus-vance-jrs-moneyball-approach-to-crime.html (on file with 
The University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting that Frank Hogan, the District Attorney in New York City for 
more than 30 years, was known as “Mr. Integrity”). 
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The Legal Aid Society in New York City, with roots back to 1876, was 
one of the first legal defense institutions in the country dedicated to representing 
indigent clients44 and was equally respected for the quality of its work in both 
civil and criminal cases. 
Finally, the New York City Bar Association had a long history of taking 
aggressive positions in reports, studies, and amicus briefs against injustice, not 
just locally but nationally and even internationally.45 
The plurality opinion of Justice White emphasized that New York City 
was very much an outlier in denying jury trials to those charged with 
misdemeanors.46 Justice White noted that all states provided jury trials for 
misdemeanors and he noted that even in New York state other cities—and he 
cited Buffalo and Albany—provided jury trials in misdemeanor cases.47 
Against this background, White concluded that “this near-uniform 
judgment of the Nation” required that the line for requiring jury trials be 
extended to offenses carrying a possible sentence of more than six months.48 
White’s opinion made New York City seem grudging and unfair for not 
following the practices of other states and other big cities in granting jury trials in 
misdemeanor cases, but New York City was in a very different situation from 
other cities in New York, and was likely in a very different position from other 
large cities like Chicago or Los Angeles. To understand the special nature of 
criminal courts in New York City, one only has to reflect on the fact that the New 
York City Criminal Court which handles misdemeanors had, at the time of 
Baldwin, a case load docket that was 39 times greater than that of Buffalo, New 
York’s second largest city.49 
Many of the weaknesses of constitutional rulemaking described in 
Section I were present in Baldwin. There is no statistical analysis comparing New 
York City to other major American cities. One would have liked to have seen a 
comparison of misdemeanor caseloads in New York City compared to other large 
cities, the number of trials in each city, and the plea-bargaining rate to see if 
those cities were providing anywhere near the number of misdemeanor trials that 
New York City provided. It might have been the case that New York City gave 
many more defendants a chance to put on a defense at trial, whereas other cities 
offered jury trials in theory but not nearly the percentage in practice as New York 
City. 
 
44.  See The History of the Legal Aid Society, THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY, http://www.legal-
aid.org/en/las/aboutus/ourhistory.aspx (last visited Apr. 3, 2020) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review) (showing that The Legal Aid Society traces its roots back to 1876). 
45.  See generally, About the New York City Bar Association, NEW YORK CITY BAR, 
http://www.nycbar.org/about-us/overview-about-us (last visited Apr. 3, 2020) (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review) (describing the history of the New York City Bar Association). 
46.  Id. at 71–72. 
47.  Id. 
48.  Id. at 72.  
49.  Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 135 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting).  
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White’s analysis in Baldwin is also missing any reference to the history 
and scope of the right to jury trials from England. In Duncan, by contrast, White 
quoted from Blackstone’s Commentaries, written in the mid-18th century, on the 
importance of jury trials as a protection against the Crown.50 White also noted in 
Duncan the distinguished pedigree of jury trials in England stretching back even 
to the Magna Carta.51 
But, the Court never looked beyond our borders in Baldwin, likely 
because you will not find jury trials for misdemeanors in England. Jury trials 
which take place in Crown Courts52 have a long history in England but so do 
magistrates’ courts which go back over 250 years and handle misdemeanors and 
even minor felonies without juries.53 Canada also does not grant defendants a 
right to jury trial in misdemeanor case.54 Both England and Canada have much 
lower incarceration rates than the United States. Might there be a connection? 
But whether or not New York City was exceptional in denying 
defendants jury trials for misdemeanors, the issue is whether the trials it provided 
were fair, which plenty of evidence shows they were fair. 
First of all, misdemeanor defendants in New York City had the right to 
ask for a trial in front of a panel of three judges. Thus they had some protection 
against the “bias and compliant judge” about which the Court worried in Duncan. 
Justice Harlan noted in dissent in Baldwin that the AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, TRIAL BY JURY had 
suggested this might be a possible compromise where jury trials are not permitted 
or are waived.55 But the Court brushed this protection aside, insisting it is 
necessary to interpose 
 
. . .between the accused and his accuser the judgment of laymen 
who are less tutored than a judge or a panel of judges, but who, 
at the same time, are less likely to function or appear to function 




50.  Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151 (1968) (citing 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws 
of England 349–50 (Cooley ed. 1899)). 
51.  Id. at 151. 
52.  See Criminal Courts, GOV. UK, https://www.gov.uk/courts (last visited Apr. 3, 2020) (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
53.  See id. (noting that one of the most famous magistrates’ courts was the Bow Street Magistrates Court 
in central London which existed for more than 250 years; its work has now been taken over by a set of four 
Magistrates’ Courts).  
54.  See LORI HAUSEGGER, MATTHEW HENNIGAR, AND TROY RIDDELL, CANADIAN COURTS: LAW, 
POLITICS, AND PROCESS 35 (2009). 
55.  Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 71 n. 16 (Harlan, J. dissenting). 
56.  Id. at 72 (majority opinion). 
The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 51 
839 
Secondly, the dissent also noted that the acquittal rate in criminal courts 
handling misdemeanors in New York City was reported to be 49%.57 This 
suggests judges were doing what they should have been doing and were not 
rubber-stamping prosecutions. White’s opinion never dealt with this issue. 
Nor did the Court address another important issue: (1) what are the likely 
consequences of requiring jury trials in terms of the availability of trials? And, 
(2) what is the tradeoff in the number of trials? In 1967, the year before Baldwin 
was decided, the New York Criminal Court provided more than 5,000 trials 
resulting in 3,023 convictions and 2,678 acquittals.58 In 2014, the New York City 
Criminal Court with 100 judges handled 252,741 misdemeanor cases.59 Of those, 
580 eventually went to trial (175 were jury trials), or less than a quarter of 1 
percent.60 Like most urban misdemeanor courts, New York City’s criminal courts 
are mills churning out conviction after conviction. The courts mark too many 
citizens with a conviction that will greatly complicate their lives—they may lose 
employment or a chance for future employment. 
How does Baldwin affect charging decisions? With no advantage in 
keeping charges at the misdemeanor level, won’t prosecutors charge felonies if 
that is an option? John Pfaff, an economist at Fordham Law School, who has 
written extensively on the causes of mass incarceration, concludes that “the 
primary engine of prison growth has been an increased willingness on the part of 
prosecutors to file felony charges.”61 Baldwin plays a role in those charging 
decisions. It is time to ask: Did Baldwin make defendants better off or far worse 
off? 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The criminal procedure revolution took almost all Bill of Rights 
protections intended for the federal system and applied them equally to state 
systems without taking the differences into account. State systems have more 
cases, they have more violent crimes, they have more interpersonal crimes, and 
they have vastly more minor criminal cases. The procedures that apply to federal 
cases—serious, often highly complex cases—are unworkable for minor criminal 
cases. 
A sad commentary on the state of affairs in misdemeanor courts is a 
report put together by public defenders in the Bronx (a borough of New York 
 
57.  Id. at 136 n. 16 (Harlan, J. dissenting).  
58.  Id.  
59.  See CRIMINAL COURT OF NEW YORK CITY, ANNUAL REPORT 2014 27 (2014), available at 
https://www.nycourts.gov/COURTS/nyc/criminal/cc_annl_rpt_2014.pdf (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review). 
60.  Id.  
61.  See John F. Pfaff, Escaping from the Standard Story: Why the Conventional Wisdom on Prison Growth 
Is Wrong, and Where We Can Go From Here, 26 FED. SENT’G REP. 265, 268 (2014). 
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City) entitled, No Day in Court.62 The report describes what happened to a cohort 
of 54 marijuana possession cases in the period between March 2011 and March 
2012. The public defenders and their clients wished to take these cases to trial 
because they thought they were winnable. 
The title sums up what unfolded. Even though the defendants wanted to 
challenge the charges against them not a single suppression hearing was ever 
completed. Eventually, the majority of the defendants were simply worn down by 
the process and accepted conditional release agreements or pleas to disorderly 
conduct charges. Approximately 30% of the cases were eventually dismissed 
outright. But those defendants paid a price because it took on average five court 
appearances and 270 days to get the cases dismissed.63 
The report details the toll the process exacted on defendants as they were 
required to return to the courthouse again and again to await hearings that rarely 
took place: 
 
After making it into the courthouse, they must wait, sometimes 
for hours, in crowded courtrooms, where judges frequently hear 
in excess of 100 cases a day, before having their cases called. 
And because prosecutors rarely reveal whether they will state 
“ready” for hearings and trial until the case is called on the 
record, the wait is colored by anxiety and uncertainty. 
 
Beyond the physical and psychological toll exacted by these 
delays, each postponement brings with it the potential for 
another missed day of work, lost wages, school absence, 
rescheduled medical appointment, financial hardship, or 
childcare emergency. Clients must pay for transportation to and 
from court. 
 
Repeated absences from work strain relationships with current 
employers, and potential employers are less likely to hire clients 
when a background check reveals a pending criminal case. 
Clients working in the public sector or in jobs requiring state-
issued licenses—such as security guards, home health aides, or 
cab drivers—are especially vulnerable, as an open case may lead 




62.  No Day in Court, THE BRONX DEFENDERS 1 (May 1, 2013), https://www.bronxdefenders.org/no-day-
in-court-a-new-report-by-the-bronx-defenders/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
63.  Id. at 3.  
64.  Id. at 12.  
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It is fair to put a share of the blame for No Day in Court on the 
prosecutors and judges. It is also fair to see what happened as revealing serious 
problems with the speedy trial statute in New York. But a share of the blame 
stems from the Court’s decision to expand the right to jury trial to minor criminal 
cases. Complicated and expensive trial procedures can be a weapon that wealthy 
and sophisticated defendants can sometimes use to wear down prosecutors and 
judges. But complicated and expensive trial procedures can also be a weapon that 
prosecutors and judges can use to wear down defendants who are poor and 
powerless. 
If we wish to lower our incarceration rate significantly, we have to start 
talking critically about some of the major planks of the criminal procedure 
revolution, no matter how painful the conversation. 
 
